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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Frank P. Lagano was fatally shot on April 12, 2007, in 
front of a diner in East Brunswick, New Jersey.  More than 
five years later, in August 2012, the Estate of Frank P. 
Lagano (“the Estate”) filed suit against, inter alia, the Bergen 
County Prosecutor’s Office (the “BCPO”) and former BCPO 
Chief of Detectives Michael Mordaga, alleging that BCPO 
personnel improperly revealed to members of organized 
crime that Lagano was an informant and this disclosure led to 
Lagano’s murder.  Specifically, the Estate contends the 
alleged disclosure of Lagano’s status as a confidential 
informant established a state-created danger in violation of 
his due process rights.  The Estate also challenges a 
December 2004 search of Lagano’s home and seizure of his 
property.  The BCPO and Mordaga (collectively, 
“Appellees”) each filed motions to dismiss the Estate’s 
complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6).   The District Court granted both motions and 
dismissed the Estate’s claims in their entirety.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  
 According to the Estate, Lagano and Michael Mordaga 
shared a long-term business and personal relationship.
1
  
                                              
1
 As is required when reviewing a district court’s 
dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), our recitation of 
the facts assumes the truthfulness of the Estate’s well-pled 
allegations.  Rea v. Fed. Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 
4 
 
Lagano was also the subject of an organized crime 
investigation by the BCPO, where Mordaga served as Chief 
of Detectives.  On December 1, 2004, BCPO detectives 
executed a search warrant at Lagano’s home in New Jersey, 
during which they seized more than $50,000 in cash along 
with other items.  Detectives from the BCPO also executed 
search warrants on Lagano’s safe deposit boxes, which 
resulted in the seizure of additional funds.  Lagano was 
charged with several crimes, including racketeering, 
promoting gambling, criminal usury, and conspiracy.    
After Lagano was charged, Mordaga allegedly brought 
Lagano to his office and instructed him to retain a specific 
attorney with the assurance that the attorney could “make his 
legal problems go away.”  (Estate’s Br. 12.)  Lagano did not 
follow Mordaga’s instructions.  Instead, according to the 
Estate’s allegations, Lagano agreed to serve as a confidential 
informant for James Sweeney, who was employed at the time 
as an investigator with the Criminal Justice Division of the 
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office (“the DCJ”). 
Mordaga subsequently attended a dinner meeting with 
Lagano, where he once again urged Lagano to hire the 
attorney he recommended, assuring him that, if he did so, 
“half his money would be returned and . . . [he] would serve 
no prison time.”  (App. 31a ¶ 28.)  Lagano rejected 
Mordaga’s offer, and their relationship “soured.”  (Id. 30a ¶ 
21.) 
                                                                                                     
2010); Gould Elec. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
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The Estate avers that sometime thereafter, “[BCPO] 
personnel . . . disclosed to alleged members of traditional 
Organized Crime families . . . that [Lagano] had been an 
informant.”  (Id. 32a ¶ 32.)  On April 12, 2007, more than two 
years after his arrest, Lagano was shot and killed.  The Estate 
argues that Lagano’s death resulted from the actions of 
Mordaga and other BCPO employees, who allegedly 
“conspired to illegally arrest and steal funds from Lagano in 
2004 and, then, intentionally, and with reckless disregard for 
Lagano’s safety, conspired to disclose Lagano’s status as a 
confidential informant to known members of Organized 
Crime.”  (Estate’s Br. 9.) 
On August 29, 2012, the Estate filed a three-count 
complaint against the State of New Jersey, the BCPO, 
Mordaga, and various John and Jane Doe Defendants.  The 
bulk of the Estate’s factual averments were based on 
allegations made by James Sweeney, who is now deceased, in 
a complaint he filed in 2010 (“the Sweeney Complaint”).2  
                                              
2
 Sweeney served as Sergeant State Investigator for the 
DCJ.  Following the termination of his employment in 
September 2008, Sweeney filed suit against the State of New 
Jersey, the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, the DCJ, 
and several officers, alleging a violation of the New Jersey 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“NJRICO”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:41-1 et. seq.  The 
Sweeney Complaint alleged widespread corruption within the 
BCPO, which he believed was involved in “business dealings 
with alleged members of Organized Crime families and the 
unlawful seizure, retention and use of monies by high ranking 
members of that County’s Prosecutor’s Office.”  (App. 114a.)  
It also alleged that several officials at the DCJ knowingly 
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The Estate contends that it discovered the facts relevant to 
this appeal through the Sweeney Complaint. 
The Estate filed a first amended complaint 
(hereinafter, “the amended complaint”) on December 12, 
2012, which asserts the same claims as averred in the original 
complaint but omits the State of New Jersey as a defendant.  
Count 1 presents a due process claim under the state-created 
danger theory, asserting that Appellees violated Lagano’s 
rights by disclosing his identity as a confidential informant, 
thus proximately causing his death.  Count 2 asserts the same 
claim, but under the New Jersey Constitution, made 
actionable via the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 10:6-1 to -2 (“NJCRA”).  Count 3 asserts violations of 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 
and 1985. 
                                                                                                     
attempted to obstruct Sweeney’s investigation into this 
corruption.   
Most relevant to this appeal, the Sweeney Complaint 
included allegations related to Mordaga’s relationship with 
Lagano, the BCPO’s organized crime investigation, and the 
search and seizure at Lagano’s home, which Sweeney 
claimed was improper.  Significantly, following Lagano’s 
murder on April 12, 2007, Sweeney alleged that he sent an 
email to a superior “advising him of sensitive data concerning 
[Mordaga] and [Lagano’s] relationship,” because he believed 
this data “could potentially have created a motive for 
[Lagano’s] murder.”  (App. 116a.) 
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 The BCPO filed a motion to dismiss, and the District 
Court granted the motion on March 22, 2013.  Mordaga then 
filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted on 
June 19, 2013.  The Estate filed this timely appeal. 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
1291.  We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(1), see Common Cause of Pa. v. Pa., 558 F.3d 
249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009), as well as Rule 12(b)(6), see Wiest v. 
Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III.  
 The District Court’s dismissal rested on several 
alternative theories: the District Court dismissed all counts on 
the basis that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO is a “person” 
amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, or the 
NJCRA; it dismissed all counts against the BCPO on the 
basis that the BCPO is entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity; it dismissed Counts 1 and 2 against 
Mordaga on the basis that he is entitled to qualified 
immunity; and it dismissed Count 3 on the alternative basis 
that it is barred by the statute of limitations.  We will discuss 
each in turn. 
A. The BCPO and Mordaga as “Persons” 
We begin with the question of whether Appellees are 
“persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §1985, or 
the NJCRA.  In its March 22, 2013 opinion, the District Court 
held that the BCPO is not a “person” subject to liability under 
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these provisions.  In its June 19, 2013 opinion, the District 
Court concluded that Mordaga is not a “person” subject to 
suit under the federal civil rights laws.  Because the District 
Court erred in reaching these conclusions, we will vacate the 
dismissal on this ground.   
1. Sections 1983 and 1985 
 Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person 
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (emphasis added).  Section 1985 imposes liability “if 
two or more persons” conspire to interfere with civil rights in 
a manner enumerated therein.  Id. § 1985 (emphasis added).
3
 
                                              
3
 We have never explicitly decided whether the term 
“person” has the same meaning under §§ 1983 and 1985.  
Nevertheless, the district courts in our Circuit have 
consistently answered that question in the affirmative.  See, 
e.g., Carabello v. Beard, 468 F. Supp. 2d 720, 723 n.2 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006); Wright v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 94-1601, 1994 
WL 597716, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
617 F. Supp. 721, 723 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 1985).  Here, neither 
party argues that “person” means something different under § 
1985 than under § 1983, and we see no reason why this 
should be so.  We, like our sister Court of Appeals in Owens 
v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979), therefore 
assume that “person” has the same meaning under both §§ 
1983 and 1985. 
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 The District Court found that the BCPO was an arm of 
the State of New Jersey, and that Mordaga, as BCPO Chief of 
Detectives, was a state official.  In Will v. Michigan 
Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Court 
held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their 
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” 4  Local 
governmental bodies and their officials, by contrast, are 
regarded as “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.  See 
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 Because local governmental bodies and their officials 
are “persons” under §§ 1983 and 1985, and state agencies and 
their officials acting in their official capacity are not, we must 
decide initially whether the BCPO is an arm of the State of 
New Jersey or of Bergen County.  If the BCPO is an arm of 
the State of New Jersey, we must then decide whether 
Mordaga has been sued exclusively in his official capacity as 
BCPO Chief of Detectives.
5
 
Our resolution of the first question—whether the 
BCPO is an arm of the State—is guided by Coleman v. Kaye, 
87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1996).  In Coleman, we held that 
“when [New Jersey] county prosecutors engage in classic law 
                                              
4
 As to officials of the State, the Court in Will 
explained that “[o]bviously, state officials literally are 
persons[,] [b]ut a suit against a state official in his or her 
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a 
suit against the official’s office.”  491 U.S. at 71. 
5
 Of course, a state official sued in his or her personal 
capacity is amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985.  See 
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). 
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enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers 
of the State.”  Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir. 
1996).  When county prosecutors perform administrative 
functions “unrelated to the duties involved in criminal 
prosecution,” however, they act as county officials.  Id. at 
1505–06. 
 Here, the District Court found that “the BCPO was 
acting within its classical function of investigating criminal 
activities and conducting criminal prosecutions with respect 
to Mr. Lagano.”  (App. 13a.)  Similarly, the District Court 
found that Mordaga “was acting as the Chief of Detectives in 
the BCPO, a state agency,” and that Mordaga was acting “in 
his official capacity in connection with the allegations made 
by Lagano’s Estate.”  (App. 8a.)  Based upon these findings, 
the District Court concluded that neither the BCPO nor 
Mordaga were amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985, and 
dismissed those claims accordingly. 
It is, of course, true that in some respects the amended 
complaint avers activity within the BCPO and actions taken 
by Mordaga that fall within the ambit of “classic law 
enforcement and investigative functions.”  Coleman, 87 F.3d 
at 1505.  But the amended complaint must be read as a whole, 
and its averments and the inferences reasonably drawn from 
those averments must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff.  See S.H. ex rel. Durell v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d. Cir. 2013).  In this case, the 
amended complaint is replete with allegations that Mordaga 
and others within the BCPO were not performing the classic 
functions of law enforcement or criminal investigators. 
For instance, the amended complaint alleged that 
Lagano and Mordaga “enjoyed a personal and business 
11 
 
relationship,” (App. 29a ¶ 11), which included “vacation[ing], 
visit[ing,] . . . socializ[ing,]” and “multiple business 
ventures.”  (Id. ¶ 12, 14.)  The amended complaint also 
alleged that Mordaga met with Lagano after Lagano’s home 
was searched, provided him with the name of a specific 
attorney, and assured Lagano that, if he retained this attorney, 
“90% of [his] problems would go away.”  (Id. 30a ¶ 20.)  
After Lagano failed to retain the recommended attorney, the 
amended complaint averred that Mordaga attended a “dinner 
meeting,” during which Mordaga advised Lagano that “half 
his money would be returned and guaranteed that [Lagano] 
would serve no prison time if [he] hired the attorney Mordaga 
recommended.”  (Id. 31a ¶ 27.)  As to the disclosure of 
Lagano’s identity as a confidential informant, the amended 
complaint alleged that “[BCPO] personnel thereafter 
disclosed to alleged members of traditional Organized Crime 
families arrested in raids on December 1, 2004 that [Lagano] 
had been an informant.”  (Id. 32a ¶ 32.) 
The amended complaint clearly alleges that Mordaga’s 
relationship with Lagano extended beyond Mordaga’s official 
role as BCPO Chief of Detectives during the BCPO 
investigation of Lagano.  It can also reasonably be inferred 
from the allegations that Mordaga was not performing classic 
investigatory and prosecutorial functions when he urged 
Lagano to retain a specific attorney on the assurance that this 
attorney could make Lagano’s problems disappear.  It can 
also be inferred from the amended complaint that the alleged 
disclosure of Lagano’s status as a confidential informant was 
unrelated to any lawful investigative or prosecutorial 
12 
 
function.
6
  These allegations support a reasonable inference 
that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO acted within their classic 
investigatory and prosecutorial functions with respect to the 
state-created danger claim advanced by the Estate.  
Accordingly, the District Court erred in holding that the 
amended complaint alleged that the BCPO and Mordaga 
acted exclusively in classic law enforcement and investigative 
functions so as to make them part of the State and thus not 
amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985. 
Even if the amended complaint could not be viewed as 
alleging conduct outside classic law enforcement and 
investigative functions, the dismissal as to Mordaga was 
incorrect for an additional reason.  Mordaga is sued not only 
in his official capacity, but also in his personal capacity.  (See 
Estate Br. 31.)  Accordingly, he most certainly is amenable to 
suit as a “person” under §§ 1983 and 1985.  See Hafer, 502 
U.S. at 27.  In Hafer, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
the theory that “state officials may not be held liable in their 
personal capacity for actions they take in their official 
capacity.”  Id.  Thus, under Hafer, the District Court erred in 
                                              
6
 Lagano’s complaint intermittently describes this 
disclosure in language that suggests it was intentional (see, 
e.g., App. 32a ¶ 32 (“[BCPO] personnel thereafter disclosed . 
. .”)), and in language that suggests it may have been 
inadvertent (see, e.g., id. ¶ 36 (“By failing to protect from 
disclosure . . . .”)).  The District Court is free to consider, 
therefore, whether the complaint sufficiently pled the 
requisite affirmative act on the part of the BCPO or Mordaga 
that is required to state a claim under the state-created danger 
theory.  See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
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dismissing the amended complaint against Mordaga in his 
personal capacity. 
2. New Jersey Civil Rights Act 
 In addition to bringing suit under the federal civil 
rights statutes, the Estate raised a claim under the NJCRA, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1 to -2.  Like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
NJCRA “premise[s] liability on the conduct of a ‘person.’”  
Lopez-Siguenza v. Roddy, No. 13-2005 (JBS/JS), 2014 WL 
1298300, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014).  New Jersey district 
courts have interpreted the NJCRA as having incorporated the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Will that, for purposes of § 1983, 
states and state officials acting in their official capacity are 
not amenable to suit.  See id. at *5; Didiano v. Balicki, Civ. 
No. 10-4483 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 1466131, at *8 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 18, 2011); Slinger v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 07-5561 
(DMC), 2008 WL 4126181, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2008), 
rev’d in part, 366 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because the 
District Court erred in concluding at this stage that neither the 
BCPO nor Mordaga were “persons” amenable to suit under 
§§ 1983 and 1985, it likewise erred in concluding that they 
are not “persons” under the NJCRA. 7  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the dismissal of Count 2 on that ground as well. 
                                              
7
 The District Court and the parties cite N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1:1-2, which defines “person” for purposes of New Jersey 
law as: 
corporations, companies, 
associations, societies, firms, 
partnerships and joint stock 
companies as well as individuals, 
14 
 
B. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity 
The District Court also dismissed the amended 
complaint as to the BCPO on the alternative basis that the 
                                                                                                     
unless restricted by the context to 
an individual as distinguished 
from a corporate entity or 
specifically restricted to 1 or some 
of the above enumerated 
synonyms and, when used to 
designate the owner of property 
which may be the subject of an 
offense, includes this State, the 
United States, any other State of 
the United States as defined infra 
and any foreign country or 
government lawfully owning or 
possessing property within this 
State. 
(emphasis added).  The District Court’s analysis focused 
solely on whether the state was used here “to designate the 
owner of property which may be the subject of an offense,” 
and concluded that it was not.  While we agree with the 
District Court that this exception for property disputes is not 
implicated here, we must nevertheless vacate the dismissal 
pursuant to the NJCRA because the District Court’s analysis 
assumes that the BCPO and Mordaga acted as agents of the 
state, and we hold that the District Court erred in drawing that 
conclusion at this stage. 
15 
 
BCPO is protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
The Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State. 
U.S. Const. amend. XI.   
Sovereign immunity extends to state agencies and state 
officers, “as long as the state is the real party in interest.”  
Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  It does not extend to counties and municipalities.  
Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 813 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“[A]lthough political subdivisions of a state, such as 
counties and municipalities, fall within the term ‘State’ as 
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, political subdivisions are 
not ‘State[s]’ under the Eleventh Amendment.”).  To 
determine whether the state is the real party in interest, this 
Court considers three factors: (1) whether the money to pay 
for the judgment would come from the state; (2) the status of 
the agency under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy 
the agency has.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. 
  Rather than applying Fitchik to the facts alleged by the 
Estate to reach the conclusion that the BCPO was entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, the District Court 
relied solely on our decision in Coleman.  The District 
16 
 
Court’s reading of Coleman is erroneous.  First, Coleman 
never mentions Fitchik.  And second, Coleman does not 
address Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.  Instead, 
Coleman focuses on the question of what entities and public 
officials may be regarded as arms and officials of the State for 
the purpose of determining whether the named entity and 
public official are to be regarded as “persons” subject to suit 
under § 1983.  The District Court’s analysis improperly 
conflates the jurisprudence interpreting the term “person” in 
the context of § 1983 with the concept of Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.  Although the existence of 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity was a factor 
considered by the Supreme Court in Will, the two concepts 
are analytically distinct.  See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30 (“Most 
certainly, Will’s holding does not rest directly on the Eleventh 
Amendment.”). 
 Appellees point to our unpublished decision in 
Beightler v. Office of Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 342 Fed. App’x 
829, 832 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam), which stated that 
Coleman “essentially analyzed the same factors presented in 
Fitchik,” as support for the District Court’s conclusion that 
the Fitchik factors are met any time a court finds that county 
prosecutors act as arms of the state by performing classic law 
enforcement functions.  However, we are not bound or 
persuaded by Beightler’s statement that the Fitchik inquiry is 
satisfied whenever a county prosecutor engages in classic 
prosecutorial functions.  We therefore conclude that Fitchik 
provides the proper framework for analyzing Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity as it applies to county 
prosecutors, and on remand the District Court must apply 
17 
 
Fitchik to determine whether the BCPO is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity in this case.
8
 
C. Qualified Immunity 
 We turn now to the District Court’s finding that 
Mordaga is protected by qualified immunity.  “The doctrine 
of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.’”  Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  To resolve a claim of 
qualified immunity, a court must engage in a two-pronged 
analysis to decide (1) whether the plaintiff alleged sufficient 
facts to establish the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) 
whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the 
defendant’s actions.  Id. at 232.   
 The Estate’s claim is grounded in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no 
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 
                                              
8
 Of course, the fact that we have held that the 
amended complaint does not allege that the BCPO was acting 
at all times within its classic prosecutorial investigative 
capacity is enough to undermine the District Court’s Eleventh 
Amendment ruling.  We emphasize, however, that the 
Eleventh Amendment inquiry is analytically distinct from the 
question of whether a county entity is a “person” for § 1983 
purposes, and Fitchik controls the Eleventh Amendment 
inquiry. 
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1.  We have recognized that “[i]ndividuals have a 
constitutional liberty interest in personal bodily integrity that 
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235.  In general, this 
liberty interest does not require the state to affirmatively 
protect its citizens.  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989).  One exception to 
this general rule is the state-created danger theory, and it is 
under this theory that the Estate proceeds on its due process 
claims.   
To establish a claim under the state-created danger 
theory, a plaintiff must prove that: 
(1) the harm ultimately caused 
was foreseeable and fairly direct;  
(2) a state actor acted with a 
degree of culpability that shocks 
the conscience; 
(3) a relationship between the 
state and the plaintiff existed such 
that the plaintiff was a foreseeable 
victim of the defendant’s acts, or 
a member of a discrete class of 
persons subjected to the potential 
harm brought about by the state’s 
actions, as opposed to a member 
of the public in general; and 
(4) a state actor affirmatively used 
his or her authority in a way that 
created a danger to the citizen or 
19 
 
that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the 
state not acted at all. 
Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 
2006) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
 The Estate asserts that Appellees—either Mordaga or 
another employee within the BCPO—disclosed Lagano’s 
status as a confidential informant to members of organized 
crime families, and that this disclosure established a state-
created danger that resulted in his murder.  Mordaga 
responded that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the 
state-created danger claims because the Estate failed to 
establish either a violation of a constitutional right, or that the 
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the 
alleged violation.   
The District Court focused on the second prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis, holding that the constitutional 
right claimed to have been violated was not clearly 
established at the time of Lagano’s murder.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the District Court reasoned that because “[t]here 
are no published cases that extend the state created danger 
right to confidential informants in the Third Circuit[,] . . . it 
would be unfair to hold that a constitutional right was ‘clearly 
established.’”  (App. 6a–7a.)  The District Court defined the 
right asserted by the Estate as “a confidential informant’s 
constitutional right to nondisclosure.”  (Id.) 
We cannot endorse the District Court’s unduly narrow 
construction of the right at issue, or its statement that the right 
was not clearly established.  It has been clearly established in 
this Circuit for nearly two decades that a state-created danger 
20 
 
violates due process.  See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 
1211 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that state-created danger theory 
is “viable mechanism for establishing a constitutional 
violation.”).  That we have not applied the state-created 
danger theory in the context of a confidential informant is not 
dispositive on the qualified immunity defense.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 
(2002), “[a]lthough earlier cases involving fundamentally 
similar facts can provide especially strong support for a 
conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not 
necessary to such a finding.”  Id. at 741 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the Estate can overcome 
Mordaga’s qualified immunity defense without proving that 
we have previously issued a binding decision recognizing a 
state-created danger in the context of the disclosure of a 
confidential informant’s status, and the District Court erred in 
requiring it to do so.   
The focus of the qualified immunity inquiry is on the 
allegations made by the Estate.  Specifically, the question is 
whether the facts averred by the Estate fall within the 
elements of the state-created danger theory, and whether “it 
would be clear to a reasonable officer” that the alleged 
disclosure was unlawful under the circumstances.  Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).  We express no opinion as to 
whether the amended complaint satisfies these inquiries, but, 
because the District Court failed to apply the proper standard, 
we must vacate the District Court’s decision in favor of 
Mordaga on the qualified immunity defense. 
D. Statute of Limitations 
  The District Court dismissed Count 3 on the 
alternative basis that it is barred by the statute of limitations.  
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In determining the length of the statute of limitations for a 
claim arising under § 1983, courts must apply the limitations 
period applicable to personal-injury torts in the State in which 
the cause of action arose.  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 
(2007).  In New Jersey, where Lagano’s claim arose, personal 
injury claims are governed by a two-year statute of 
limitations.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
9
  Consequently, the 
statute of limitations for Count 3, which asserts a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures made actionable under §§ 1983 and 
1985, is two years.  Because the Estate did not file suit until 
August 29, 2012, the cause of action, to be timely, cannot 
have accrued earlier than August 29, 2010. 
The date of accrual of a § 1983 claim is a matter of 
federal law.  Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.  We have described 
that inquiry as follows:  
Accrual is the occurrence of 
damages caused by a wrongful 
act—“when a plaintiff has ‘a 
complete and present cause of 
action,’ that is, when ‘the plaintiff 
can file suit and obtain relief.’” 
[Wallace, 539 U.S. at 388] 
(quoting Bay Area Laundry and 
Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund 
                                              
9
 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:12-2(a), in pertinent part, 
provides that “[e]very action at law for an injury to the person 
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person 
within this State shall be commenced within 2 years next after 
the cause of such action shall have accrued . . . .” 
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v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 
192, 201 (1997)).  As the Court in 
Wallace explained, “‘the tort 
cause of action accrues, and the 
statute of limitations commences 
to run, when the wrongful act or 
omission results in damages.’”  
Id. at 391 (quoting 1 Calvin W. 
Corman, Limitation of Actions § 
7.4.1 (1991)). 
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185–86 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
Here, the search of Lagano’s home took place on 
December 1, 2004.  On January 13, 2005, the BCPO brought 
a forfeiture action against Lagano under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:65-1, claiming that a total of $265,428 was seized from 
Lagano during the search.  Lagano filed an answer to the 
forfeiture action in 2005, and the Estate was substituted in 
Lagano’s place following his death in 2007.  Without arguing 
for any specific date, Appellees contend that “[a]t the very 
latest, the theft claim accrued in 2007, when the Estate 
became a party to the forfeiture action,” and that as a result, 
the statute of limitations would have run at the latest in 2009.  
(Appellees’ Br. 40.)  The District Court agreed, finding that 
the Estate “knew or should have known about the search and 
seizure claims at the time of filing of Lagano’s Answer on 
March 9, 2005, or at the latest, in 2007, when the Estate 
became involved in that action.”  In this regard, the District 
Court observed that “[u]pon substitution into the forfeiture 
action, the Estate had access to Lagano’s documents and 
filings involving the search and seizure matters.”  (App. 16a.) 
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The Estate argues that the cause of action did not 
accrue until Sweeney filed his complaint in federal court in 
September 2010.
10
  Although Lagano filed an answer to the 
forfeiture action in 2005, the Estate still argues that the 
answer “merely acknowledges Lagano’s awareness of the 
search and seizure, not the illegality of it,” and that the 
answer therefore did not put the Estate on notice that 
Lagano’s rights were violated.  (Appellant’s Br. 45.)  Thus, 
according to the Estate, the cause of action did not accrue 
until the Sweeney Complaint was filed in September 2010, 
and the statute of limitations did not expire until September 
                                              
10
 The relevant allegations in the Sweeney Complaint 
state that members of the BCPO “confiscated the monies 
from [Lagano’s] home and failed and/or refused to provide 
the family with a receipt of same when they requested an 
inventory,”  (App. 111a ¶ 28), “searched the safe deposit box 
only after directing the bank representative to leave the 
room,”  (id. ¶ 30), “seized items from [Lagano’s] safe deposit 
box and failed and/or refused to provide a receipt of same,”  
(id. ¶ 31), and that “after the arrest, [Lagano’s] relationship 
with [Mordaga] soured in part because [Lagano] claimed not 
all of his money and property was returned to him.”  (Id. 112a 
¶ 36.)  Perhaps most relevant to the claim asserted in Count 3, 
the Sweeney Complaint also states that Sweeney “advised his 
superiors . . . of potential corruption within the hierarchy of 
that County Prosecutor’s Office, including business dealings 
with alleged members of Organized Crime families and the 
unlawful seizure, retention and use of monies by high ranking 
members of that County Prosecutor’s Office.”  (Id. 114a ¶ 50 
(emphasis added).) 
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2012.  Under this theory, the Estate’s August 2012 complaint 
would be timely. 
The Estate’s arguments are unpersuasive.  Lagano’s 
home was searched and his property was seized in December 
2004, giving rise to the claim for damages.  The record 
demonstrates that Lagano himself knew about the allegedly 
unlawful search and seizure by March 2005 at the latest, and 
thus had a complete cause of action at that time.  See Dique, 
603 F.3d at 185–86.  As a result, the two-year period of 
limitations expired in March 2007, before Lagano’s death the 
following month.  We therefore hold that Count 3 is barred by 
the statute of limitations, and we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Count 3 accordingly. 
IV.  
 We must address one final issue.  The Estate argues 
that it should be permitted to file a second amended 
complaint upon remand.  We agree.  We have held that 
whether or not a plaintiff seeks leave to amend, a district 
court considering a 12(b)(6) dismissal “must permit a curative 
amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable 
or futile.”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 
363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Here, the District Court 
dismissed the Estate’s complaint against the BCPO with 
prejudice without making a finding that further amendment 
would be futile.  This, too, was improper.  The Estate must be 
permitted to file a second amended complaint unless the 
District Court makes a finding of futility. 
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V.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate in part the judgment entered by the District Court, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
